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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we develop a market screening model to detect inconstancies in price 
changes. Although there is a long history of industrial organization research of collusion, 
price setting behavior, and conduct — a robust model to detect structural changes in market 
structure was missing so far. Our non-parametric approach closes this gap and can be used 
as a tentative warning system for emerging collusions. Based on the theoretical and 
empirical results from previous research, we describe requirements of screenings, develop a 
model, and illustrate our approach with a short market simulation. Finally, we apply the 
model to the German electricity market. According to our results, between 2001 and 2011 
energy suppliers appear to be successful in controlling the market price for several phases. 
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I. Introduction 
The development of a proper screening model for competition policy has gained in 
importance over the last years, especially with respect to price collusion. Although the 
European Commission has not dealt with many cases, between 2004 and 2011 competition 
authorities in Europe carried out over one hundred market-monitoring actions, about 1,300 
merger cases, and 180 antitrust cases – half of which were cartels.1 
The aim of this paper is to develop an empirical model that consistently measures 
shifts in price variation, which can be used by antitrust authorities for screening purposes. The 
approach can also be useful as an additional technique for establishing damages in antitrust 
legal proceedings concerning price fixing agreements. 
Previous findings have shown that collusive behavior can be detected by analyzing 
empirical data. In this context, Sherwin and Stigler (1985), Bolotova et al. (2008), Böckers et 
al. (2011), Blanckenburg and Geist (2009, 2011) analyze price dispersion. Blanckenburg et 
al. (2012) compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and non-collusive 
periods for eleven major cartels. They found that 9 out of 11 cartels were successful in 
controlling the market price for a number of years. However, the presented cases were already 
prosecuted by the European antitrust authority.  
In this paper, we present a model to detect an unknown suspicion of a collusive period. 
A general requirement is to adapt an appropriate method that screens time series data 
independently. The model is illustrated by applying it for German energy markets due to the 
fact that on these markets, collusion periods can be supposed in the past. In order to simplify 
the understanding of the developed methodology, we provide a short example and a market 
simulation. In this exemplary analysis, we assume a typical power market, where supplier 
                                                          
1 Mentioned by J. Almunia (EU Commission) at ”Antitrust enforcement: Challenges old and new 19th 
International Competition Law Forum”, St. Gallen (8 June 2012). 
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may be able to manipulate prices. We simulate time series for different manipulation 
scenarios and show how our empirical approach works. 
 
II. Requirement of screening models  
A typical framework for analysing market power in industrial organization is to 
estimate structural models in order to gain an impression about the degree of competition in 
certain markets. Heijnen et al. (2012) develop, for example, a method to identify statistical 
evidence of clustering of outlets that score high on some characteristic that is consistent with 
collusive behavior. Harrington (2005, 2008) mentions requirements for systematic and 
ubiquitous market screenings. Evidence of collusive patterns must be discernible by just 
looking at the available data, such as prices. The procedure should be automatable so that it 
can be carried out with minimal human input. However, for many markets exact and reliable 
data are notoriously difficult to obtain.  
Market manipulations lead to multiple changes in industry structure and behavior. 
Stigler (1964) states that price dispersion is ubiquitous, even for homogenous products. It 
takes place when different suppliers offer different prices for the same good on a certain 
market. Several studies, including Carlson and McAfee (1983), Carlton (1986) demonstrate 
that price dispersion is greater when industry concentration declines. Furthermore, according 
to Connor (2005), cartels usually fix prices either by announcing list prices to buyers and 
agreeing to sell only at this price or by agreeing to sell at some lower “floor” (minimum) price 
or at a “target” (average) price below list. Some cartels also agree to eliminate or restrict 
discounts, which reduces the variance of prices. There is some empirical support for this 
hypothesis. Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) examine the effects of a bid-rigging cartel in frozen 
perch sold to the U.S. Department of Defence. As a result, they find a relatively small 
difference in price, but a huge difference in variance, when comparing the collusive and 
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competitive regimes. The average price dropped 23% after the conspiracy was detected, but 
even more significant, the variance of price increased by 145%, compared to the variance 
during the cartel period. For the lysine cartel, Bolotova et al. (2008) find support for the 
hypotheses that the mean increases and the variance decreases in the cartel period relative to 
the competitive regimes. Citric acid prices examined in that study confirm the mean price 
hypothesis, but fail to support the variance hypothesis. The variance was even higher as 
compared to the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. Blanckenburg and Geist (2009) find a 
significantly lower variance in price changes for the cartel period of the German cement 
industry 1981-2001, compared to the pre- and post-cartel periods. Hüschelrath and Veith 
(2011) argue that customers of hard core cartels can have both incentives and possibilities to 
detect such agreements on their own initiative through the use of market-specific data sets. 
However, a robust screening needs adequate data and methods.  
  
III. An empirical approach to detect inconsistencies 
This section describes an empirical approach to detection of the cartel periods. The 
idea is that by analyzing the distribution of the growth rates of price for a product in two 
different time intervals we can judge whether the price setting for this product in each of the 
sub-periods has a different nature and which of the sub-periods can be characterized as a free 
competition or a cartel phase. A natural idea would be to compare the moments (say, mean or 
variance) of two distributions in order to tell them apart. However, as shown in Blanckenburg 
et al. (2012), none of the first four moments of the distribution, with an exception perhaps of 
variance, can be considered as a robust indicator allowing to distinguish between competition 
and cartel. In fact, a comparison of the whole distributions in each sub-period is needed. 
Therefore, we suggest to employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is a non-
parametric (distribution-free) test comparing two distributions. In fact, the Kolmogorov–
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Smirnov D-statistic measures a distance between the empirical distribution functions of two 
samples. The null hypothesis of the test states that both samples are drawn from the same 
distribution. Formally, the test statistic is defined as follows: 
ܦ ൌ ݏݑ݌∆ ௧ܲ |ܨ଴ሺ∆ ௧ܲሻ െ ܨଵሺ∆ ௧ܲሻ| (1) 
where F0(Pt) and F1(Pt) are the empirical cumulative distribution functions constructed for 
each of the two samples being compared; and ΔPt is the variable of price changes in period t. 
In words, the empirical cumulative distribution functions are compared (as absolute 
differences of function values) in each point of distribution support and then the largest 
absolute difference is taken as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic. When this supremum’s 
absolute difference exceeds certain critical value, the null hypothesis of two samples being 
drawn from the same distribution is rejected. 
The empirical density functions were obtained using the Gaussian kernel. The 
smoothing bandwidth for this kernel is computed using the following rule-of-thumb:  
ܤܹ ൌ 0.9୫୧୬	ሺఙ,ூொோሻଵ.ଷସ்షభ/ఱ  (2) 
where σ is the standard deviation; IQR is the interquartile range; and T is the sample size. All 
computations are made using the programming language R. 
In fact, this question setting is equivalent to that of structural break, or regime 
switching detection. For instance, a period of free competition is succeeded by a cartel period, 
which represents a structural break or change in regime. Our task is to determine the timing of 
the structural break, which is typically unknown. As a matter of fact, six following situations 
are possible: 1) all the time competition; 2) all the time cartel; 3) first competition, then cartel; 
4) first competition, then cartel, then again competition; 5) first cartel, then competition; and 
6) first cartel, then competition, then again cartel. The most interesting case is 3), when we are 
actually trying to detect an existing cartel. The last situation is probably the least likely one, 
especially when the sample is short. Thus, we may have between 0 and 2 breakpoints. 
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Similarly to the standard structural break tests with unknown break point (e.g., sup-
likelihood-ratio and sup-Wald tests described in Andrews, 1993) we need to run a sequence of 
KS-tests over rolling sub-periods (windows). However, in our case in addition to the 
breakpoint, , we need to estimate also the length of window, w. Thus, the cartel phase, if any, 
is then defined given a combination of  and w, for which the maximum KS-statistic 
exceeding the critical value is attained. Formally: 
ሺ߬∗, ݓ∗ሻ ൌ arg݉ܽݔሺܦఛ,௪ሻ߬, ݓ  (3) 
where D is the KS test statistic, which compares the distributions of price changes in two 
sub-periods: 1) cartel-suspected sub-period ሾܶ െ ݓ െ ߬ ൅ 2, ܶ െ ߬ ൅ 1ሿ and 2) the union of 
sub-periods before and after cartel-suspected sub-period ሾ2, ܶ െ ݓ െ ߬ ൅ 1ሿ ∪ ሾܶ െ ߬ ൅ 2, ܶሿ. 
Thus, if * and w* exist, then the cartel phase is defined as the time interval ሾܶ െ ݓ∗ െ ߬∗ ൅
2, ܶ െ ߬∗ ൅ 1ሿ. 
 The decision on accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis is made based on the p-
values corresponding to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-statistic. These are computed using 
bootstrap with the number of samples equal to 1000. 
 A possible further development of the cartel testing technique can be supplementing 
the price information by the data on capacity utilization. In that case, a multivariate version of 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test could be used. This would allow comparing the joint 
distribution of prices and, for instance, capacity utilization and better identifying the cartels, 
since not only the behavior of the prices but also their relationship with quantity can change 
under cartel. 
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IV. A short example and simulation results 
In this section, a short example of how manipulations can occur and how we are able 
to detect them will be introduced. In anticipation of the empirical section we choose a setup 
describing a common power market where supplier may be able to cause price inconstancies 
in order to gain market power. For this setup, we present four simulation scenarios and 
demonstrate how our empirical approach works. 
Imagine a typical power market, where pricing underlie particular terms. It is not 
possible to store the generated power efficiently. As result, the storage of power is only 
possible for a marginal size. Consequently, power generation and the actual demand have to 
match. As a consequence, every hourly spot price is the pricing of a single product. The price 
of every hourly output is determined by the marginal costs of the last power plant that is 
needed to satisfy the demand. Figure 1 illustrates this principle. For more detail on this 
mechanism see, e. g., Sensfuß et al. (2008). 
Figure 1: Merit-Order supply curve 
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Assume that there exists a fictive pool of power plants. This pool consists of hydro power 
plants, wind power plants, photovoltaic power plants, nuclear power plants as well as of coal 
and gas power plants. The power plants are used to meet demand in order to cover their 
marginal costs. The plants with lower prices will be used before those with higher prices – 
we speak about a merit-order supply function. In terms of Figure 1 it means the following: 
When demand is equal to 14 MWh/h (vertical line), the market price will be 15 €/MWh/h. In 
order to meet the demand all hydro-, wind- and photovoltaic power plants must be put into 
operation. Moreover, additional 4 MWh/h must be generated by the nuclear power plants. 
Since the nuclear power plants are the last plants that will be needed to satisfy demand, the 
marginal costs of these plants determine the market price. As a result, all lower priced plants 
earn an additional profit margin above their marginal costs. Let us illustrate this using the 
example of the wind power plants. The marginal costs for the wind power plants are 2 
€/MWh/h; at a price of 15 €/MWh/h the wind power plants earn an additional margin of 13 
€/MWh/h (15 €/MWh/h – 2 €/MWh/h). So the marginal plant earns only its marginal costs. 
Let us assume that the conventional nuclear, coal, and gas power plants are owned by a single 
company, so this company can exploit its market power by artificially restraining its 
capacities. For further literature regarding market power behavior in electricity markets see 
e.g. David and Wen (2001), Bunn and Oliveira (2003), Müsgens (2006), Weigt and 
Hirschhausen (2008). For example — as shown in Figure 2 — when the company reduces the 
power supply by 2 MWh/h, then this would lead to a shift in the supply curve: The market 
price will now be determined by the coal power plants only and attain 25 €/MWh/h. 
Consequently, all plants with marginal costs below 25 €/MWh/h will now earn an additional 
margin of 10 €/MWh/h. 
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Figure 2: Merit-Order supply curve with manipulation 
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b) Market power is exploited: In the time periods from 300 until 365 a systematic 
manipulation through restraining capacities takes place. Every restraint takes 10 
days; after 10 days the restraint will increase to the next higher level.  
c)  Market power is exploited like in b) but the manipulation’s intensity is incrementally 
reduced: The manipulation induced price changes will reduce in three steps (80 
percent, 70 percent, 60 percent). 
Figure 3 shows the absolute prices for case a) (see the upper panel) and the corresponding 
price changes (see the second panel from above). The third panel from above shows a case 
of the absolute prices with manipulation as well as the corresponding price changes for 
case b). 
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Figure 3: Prices and price changes without (panels 1 and 2) and with (panels 3 and 4) manipulation 
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First of all we investigate the base scenario a). As expected, no abnormalities could be 
identified. For the sake of clarity of exposition, we do not present the results, however, they 
are available upon request. Instead, we investigate the case with 100 percent manipulation b) 
using the screening method. Since the manipulation period is unknown to the investigator, 
well an appropriate criterion for the choice of the window width is needed. We have run the 
screening with window widths from 1 day to 86 days. In order to identify the suspicious time 
period we look at the p-values. Table 1 reports all window widths, their starting and ending 
periods as well as the corresponding KS-statistic and the p-value. To save space we only show 
cases that are significant at a 99% level (p<0.01). As can be seen in Table 1, all statistically 
significant windows are in the manipulation period. 
Table 1: Results for 100% manipulation scenario 
No. Window size KS-statistic p-value Start End 
1 85 0.2038 0.007 274 358 
2 75 0.2251 0.005 284 358 
3 80 0.2103 0.003 284 363 
4 65 0.2364 0.006 294 358 
5 60 0.2446 0.007 295 354 
6 70 0.2302 0.004 295 364 
7 45 0.2583 0.008 305 349 
8 44 0.2445 0.009 307 350 
9 41 0.2536 0.008 308 348 
10 50 0.2618 0.007 309 358 
11 40 0.2669 0.009 309 348 
12 35 0.2811 0.008 309 343 
13 39 0.2673 0.008 309 347 
14 42 0.2728 0.005 309 350 
15 37 0.2796 0.003 309 345 
16 41 0.2722 0.003 309 349 
17 45 0.2805 0.001 310 354 
18 55 0.2435 0.008 310 364 
19 36 0.2696 0.009 310 345 
20 42 0.2583 0.009 310 351 
21 40 0.2762 0.008 310 349 
22 41 0.2687 0.006 310 350 
23 45 0.2805 0.003 310 354 
24 15 0.4098 0.009 331 345 
25 18 0.3754 0.009 331 348 
26 24 0.3256 0.009 331 354 
27 18 0.3725 0.007 332 349 
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This is shown in Figure 4 (panel i).  The vertical dashed line represents the starting time of the 
manipulation period. The manipulation period continues until the end of the investigation 
period. The blue rhombi symbolize the identified starting time points of the manipulation 
period for all statistically significant windows. The red quadratic points symbolize the 
identified ending time points of the manipulation period. Following up thereon, as described 
in case c), we have reduced the intensity of manipulation from 100 percent stepwise to 80 
percent, 70 percent, and 60 percent. 
It has been found that all windows identified in case b) are still statistically significant. 
Furthermore, as is shown in panel (ii) of Figure 4, nearly all identified manipulation periods 
belong to the true manipulation period. In the case of manipulation with a 70 percent intensity 
four windows (# 1, 2, 3, and 4) are no longer significant — in comparison to the windows for 
the 100 percent case — and therefore are not shown. The windows of the # 27, 25, and 24 are 
statistically significant, but the identified cartel period does not correspond to the true 
manipulation period. All other windows correctly identify the manipulation period.  In the 
case of a 60 percent manipulation intensity, only the windows # 27, 25, and 24 are statistically 
significant. Panel (iv) of Figure 4 shows that no significant window coincides with the true 
manipulation period.  
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Figure 4: Graphical characterization of manipulation scenarios i)-iv) 
 
i) 100% manipulation ii) 80% manipulation 
 
iii) 70% manipulation iv) 60% manipulation 
  
The aim of this section was to illustrate the application of the screening method introduced in 
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V. Empirical application to German energy markets 
a. Data description 
Here we use historical Phelix Base EPEX spot data as a measure for German power 
prices. Phelix refers to the Physical Electricity Index and is calculated and published as Phelix 
Base, a registered trademark of the European Energy Exchange AG (EEX). Average prices of 
the hours 1 to 24 for electricity traded on the spot market are used. Data are calculated for all 
calendar days of the year in the market area Germany disregarding power transmission 
bottlenecks.2 
Figure 5 shows prices and price changes on the German power market.  
Figure 5: Prices and price changes on the German power market 
 
 
 
 
i) prices ii) price changes 
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2 http://static.epexspot.com/document/12848/EPEXSpot_Indices.pdf (retrieved 27 November 2012). 
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around zero with a mean of -0.01 €/MWh and a median of 1.02 €/MWh. Most price changes 
lie between the 1st quantile of -4.18 €/MWh and the 3rd quantile of 5.77 €/MWh. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of prices (ܲ) and price changes (∆ܲ).  
 ܲ ∆ܲ 
Unit € / MWh € / MWh 
Time span 1/2/2001-8/2/2011 1/3/2001-8/2/2011 
Number of observations 4,230 4,229 
Minimum -35.57 -214.8 
1st quantile 26.91 -4.18 
Median 37.3 1.02 
Mean 40.12 -0.01 
3rd quantile 49.72 5.77 
Maximum 301.5 191.2 
 
b. Results 
In order to detect whether price manipulations on German power markets occur, we 
used the earlier introduced methodology. Thereby, we need to run a sequence of KS-tests over 
rolling sub-periods. However, in our case, in addition to manipulation phases, we first need to 
estimate the length of window w. Assuming that we are only able to detect manipulated prices 
if they occur for a certain period, we set a minimum window to w=30 days (~1 month) and 
step of 1 day. In order to be able to detect possible long-term manipulations we increased w 
from 30 to 750 days, to cover possible manipulations from 1 month up to 2 years.  
Our results are presented in Table 3. We identify five suspicious phases (I-V) where 
the distribution of price changes differs with large significance. Phase I starts in November 
and ends in December 2001. Phase II lies between October and November 2005, followed by 
Phase III with three suspicious windows between June and October 2006. After Phase IV 
(10/2007-11/2007) and Phase V (9/2008-10/2008) no more windows are detected until 
02/2011. In all detected phases, KS-statistics are higher than 0.35 and significant at a 1% 
level. However, the windows that are significant at 5%-10% levels are not shown in Table 3. 
It is worth noticing that no windows wider than 2 months were highly significant. That means 
we find no hint on long-term inconstancies. 
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Table 3: Suspicious windows of price changes on the German power market 2001-2012 
 Window   
Phase Start date End date Size KS-statistic p-value 
I 11/18/2001 12/18/2001 30 0.4850 0.000 
11/19/2001 12/19/2001 30 0.4121 0.000 
II 
10/30/2005 11/29/2005 30 0.3504 0.000 
11/11/2005 12/11/2005 30 0.3621 0.001 
… … … …  
11/22/2005 12/22/2005 30 0.3659 0.000 
III 
6/28/2006 7/28/2006 30 0.4033 0.000 
7/28/2006 8/27/2006 30 0.4321 0.000 
10/9/2006 11/8/2006 30 0.3740 0.002 
IV 
10/19/2007 11/18/2007 60 0.3520 0.000 
… … … …  
11/20/2007 12/20/2007 30 0.3778 0.001 
V 
9/7/2008 10/7/2008 30 0.3628 0.002 
9/8/2008 10/8/2008 30 0.3549 0.001 
9/11/2008 10/11/2008 30 0.3581 0.001 
9/12/2008 10/12/2008 30 0.3707 0.000 
9/16/2008 10/16/2008 30 0.3564 0.000 
9/18/2008 10/18/2008 30 0.3519 0.000 
9/20/2008 10/20/2008 30 0.3550 0.000 
9/21/2008 10/21/2008 30 0.3528 0.000 
9/28/2008 10/28/2008 30 0.3721 0.001 
9/29/2008 10/29/2008 30 0.3857 0.000 
Note: Only KS-statistics, which are significant at a 99% level, are shown. 
Dots (…) represent a continuum in days (e.g. 11/11/2005 until 11/22/2005). 
All Windows have significant KS-Statistics in these days. 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates our results. One can easily identify the five detected phases. To 
highlight these suspected periods we inserted a horizontal line at KS-statistic value of 0.35.  
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Figure 6: Inconsistencies in price changes on the German power market 2001-2012 
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insignificant. However, manipulations can be detected if they hold up at least one month, 
using daily data. 
Finally, we adopt the model to German electricity markets. According to our results, 
between 2001 and 2011 energy suppliers were probably successful in controlling the market 
price for several phases. We detect five suspicious phases in which the observed distribution 
of price changes differ with highly significance. Phase I (11/2001-12/2001), Phase II 
(10/2005-11/2005), Phase III (06/2006-10/2006), Phase IV (10/2007-11/2007), and Phase V 
(9/2008-10/2008). We do not provide economic explanations of the detected suspicious 
phases in this paper. However, Müsgens (2006) uses data for the German power market from 
06/2000-06/2003 and finds for a few months after August 2001 strong evidence for market 
power. This is consonant with our results. Other empirical possibilities for comparisons do 
not exist so far. 
Further research would be to apply the proposed model to other markets. Thereby an 
application to other data is possible as well. For instance, antitrust agencies (or other 
institutions) may access capacity utilization or financial data. Moreover, taking into account 
macroeconomic events, such as a phase of the business cycle, could be useful. However, this 
paper shows how our model could easily be used in a general screening. In addition, there is a 
necessity for further developments concerning the proposed methods for model validation. 
 
  
 
 
19 
 
References 
Andrews, D. W. K. (1993). Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change with 
Unknown Change Point, Econometrica, 61(4), 821-856. 
Abrantes-Metz, R. M., Froeb, L. M., Geweke, J., Taylor, C. T. (2006). A Variance Screen for 
Collusion. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, 467-486. 
Blanckenburg, K.v., Geist, A. and Kholodilin, K.A. (2012). The Influence of Collusion on 
Price Changes: New Evidence from Major Cartel Cases, German Economic Review, 13(3), 
245-256. 
Blanckenburg, K.v. and Geist, A. (2011): Detecting Illegal Activities: The Case of Cartels, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 32(1), 15-33. 
Blanckenburg, K.v. and Geist, A. (2009): How Can a Cartel be Detected?, International 
Advances in Economic Research, 15(4), 421-436. 
Boeckers, V., Haucap, J. and Heimeshoff, U. (2011): Screening for Collective Dominance: 
The Case of the European Mobile Telecommunications, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909545. 
Bolotova, Y., Connor, J. M. and Miller D. J. (2008): The Impact of Collusion on Price 
Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases, International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 26, 1290-1307. 
Brunn, D.W., Oliveira, F.S. (2003): Evaluating Individual Market Power in Electricity 
Markets via Agent-Based Simulation, Annals of Operations Research, 121(1-4), 57-77. 
Carlson, J. and McAfee, R. (1983): Discrete Equilibrium Price Dispersion, Journal of 
Political Economy, 91 (3), 480-493. 
Carlton, D.W. (1986): The rigidity of prices, American Economic Review, 76, 637-658. 
Connor, J. M. (2005): Collusion and Price Dispersion, Applied Economics Letters, 12, 335-
338. 
 
 
20 
 
Harrington, J. (2008): Detecting Cartels, Handbook in Antitrust Economics, Buccirossi, P. 
(ed.), MIT Press, Chapter 6, 213-258. 
Harrington, J. (2005): Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority. 
International Economic Review, 46(1), 145-169. 
Heijnen, P., Haan, M.A., Soetevent, A.R. (2012): Screening for Collusion: A Spatial Statistics 
Approach, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, No. 12-058. 
Hüschelrath, K., Veith, T. (2011): Cartel detection in procurement markets, ZEW Discussion 
Papers, No. 11-066. 
Kumar David, A., Wen, F. (2001): Market power in electricity supply, IEEE Trans Energy 
Conversion, 4(3), 61-92. 
Müsgens, F. (2006): Quantifying Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity Market 
using a Dynamic Multi-Regional Dispatch Model, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 
LIV(4), 471-498. 
Sensfuß, F., Ragwitz, M., Genoese, M. (2008): The merit-order effect: A detailed analysis of 
the price effect of renewable electricity generation on spot market prices in Germany, 
Energy Policy, 36(8), 3086-3094. 
Sherwin, Robert A., and George J. Stigler (1985): The Extent Of The Market, Journal of Law 
and Economics, 28, 555-586. 
Stigler, G. (1964): A theory of oligopoly,  Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), 44-61. 
Weigt, H., Hirschhausen, C. (2008): Price formation and market power in the German 
wholesale electricity market in 2006, Energy Policy, 36(11), 4227-4234. 
